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Books : The Best and Brightest (Halberstam)

The Best and Brightest

Halberstam "Best and Brightest" book would raise sharp critism of military reporting, chain of command, and the ability to quantify "win or loss" progress reports; blistering critisms of the theory of containment and late recognition of western warfare tactics. Halberstam provided a bias favoritism of the Kennedy Administration protraying them as intellectual rationalist who recruited some of the most brillant academic minds to the team: McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk. Halberstam claims internal Intelligence battles would cause strong mistrust as he elaborates on state department visit to viet nam to gather accurate information relating to the Makong valley. Halberstam protrays Lydon Johnson as the Vice President who assumed command of a group of brillant Kennedy staffers after Kennedy's assassination. Johnson would continue the war in Vietnam. Nixon would face political pressure to reduce America's military commitment and eventual return soldiers home.

The philosophy of mutal destruction was starting to materialize. Nuclear weapon build up after the "Bay of Pigs" and the Cubian missile crisis caused increased military spending in long range and submarine mobile capability. Deterence through first strike destruction and strength caused the Russians to back down. Diem was not popular in America or Vietnam. The miltary would send advisors to train southern vietnam officers in western counter guerilla fighting tactics. Halberstam shared insight into the coup the killed Diem. Military Advisors increase from 3000 to 16000 increasing the inherit danger of becoming involved.

Kennian strategy of containment of communism became popular with the Kennedy Administration following an Berlin era of the Cold war. The communist had taken China. Kennedy would feel Vietnam symbolized a stand against communism expansion. There was already a series of tensions or conflicts against communism: Berlin airlift, Korean War, China, and Yugoslavic Europe.

General Max Taylor, Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe a war in Vietnam could be won using Ariel bombing. Drawing from experiences from the Korean war Taylor hoped to gain a victory within a year. The Vietcong did not rely on resource associated with Petroleum. They could blend in with the local population, remain mobile, and converge in massive shock force. The effectiveness of the bombing campaign in weaken the enemy was ineffective.

General Taylor curtailed the usage of nuclear tactical weapons because he felt the could not be limited to a specific area and nuclear strike estimates of 300 million killed in one day caused him to fear the obliterative potential. At the end of the book, Nixon would start his ABM and Strategic reduction of global missile counts.

Airstrikes required ground troop keeping bases open to attack the enemy. Airbases were key to continue the air offensive. As a result the philosophy of containment would be replace with "search and destroy" tactics. Weaken the enemy before they could attack. Special Forces would seek out strong hold pockets where the Vietcong resided an destroy them.

Nixon launching operation Rolling Thunder would suggest a continued believe in the air offensive effectivenes but the "Tet Offensive" would demostrate remaining the strength of the Vietcong. Its surprising three administrations would struggle with foreign policy, political battles interfering with military campaigns, and confusion about western warfare tactics and objectives. A ground war was need with 500,000 fighting and more than 200,000 increase being requested. Traditional western warfare shock tactics and complete destruction strategies coming to late in the war. Conclusions, limited fighting could never work. Abandonment of the war took longer than the American public expected. Closure of the war was political regardless of military accessments of "wins". Military doctrine would never again believe in the philosophy of containment or political handcuffing. The Military commanders would seek better planning and design and freedom to fight a military war an not a political war.

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